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Speaking on Behalf of Others:
Rhetorical Agency and Epideictic
Functions in Official Apologies
Lisa Storm Villadsen
The official apology is a discursive phenomenon with complex rhetorical significance and
must be distinguished from the apologia. The main difference is that the official apology
entails an element of regret and acknowledgement of wrongdoing that makes it an even
more delicate rhetorical matter than the apologia—not least because it involves a
collectivity such as a nation state. The symbolic nature of the assumption of guilt is
therefore particularly clear. This article argues that official apologies, however
circumscribed by public skepticism, nevertheless may serve important functions as loci for
articulating the norms of a society at a given time. The article discusses how the official
apology raises a host of issues concerning rhetorical agency and argues that this particular
type of rhetoric is promising point of departure in the ongoing pedagogical and theoretical
exploration of the concept of rhetorical agency. By integrating theories of epideictic rhetoric
and of rhetorical agency, the complexity of the official apology is analyzed, and through
a reading of an official apology by the Danish Prime minister, the essay examines how
rhetorical agency is both established and undercut by the speaker.
Introduction
Official apologies—statements issued by an official on behalf of a public
collective (such as a nation state or a government) to apologize for wrongful
deeds done in the past—seem to make up a genre on the rise in the United
States and worldwide.1 Brooks calls our time ‘‘the Age of Apology’’ and
1Cunningham compiled recent examples and categorized them. Here are a few examples: Queen
Elizabeth II, speaking for the Crown, apologized for the wrongs done to the Maoris of New Zealand
in 1998, South Africa’s president F.W. de Klerk apologized in 1993 for the policies of the former
apartheid system, the late Pope John Paul II expressed regret for failure of the Roman Catholics
to do enough to prevent the Holocaust, and, in 1998, the Canadian government apologized to the
indigenous people for decades of abuse at federally funded boarding schools that were part of the
now-discredited assimilationist policy during the 1930s and ‘40s.
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claims that it is not just a fad or a result of sanctioned sentimentality (3). In
fact, Brooks regards the official apology as a constructive gesture that com-
bines guilt and sorrow and makes atonement and national rebirth possible.
But in some cultural contexts, official apologies are also occasionally
regarded with skepticism as a disingenuous measure serving purposes of
political correctness, distraction, or other particular political agendas.2 The
official apology thus raises both pragmatic and theoretical questions.
As an ‘‘apology-by-proxy,’’ as Harter, Stephens, and Japp call it (29), the
official apology is indeed a curious rhetorical phenomenon involving a
speaker apologizing, on behalf of a group, for something neither the speaker
nor the vast majority of the group did—often to a group of people who,
while representative, were not among those originally wronged. The focus
of this article is on how the apologetic and epideictic traits of the official
apology can help explain the role of rhetorical agency in this kind of utter-
ance. It is argued that epideictic theory is a valuable resource for conceptua-
lizing the rhetorical agency at play in official apologies and also may serve in
the defense of this rhetorical form as a site of public ethical reflection.
Because an official apology implies a symbolic collective assumption of
responsibility, it provides us with a constructive angle from which to examine
the nature of the speaker’s rhetorical mandate to pronounce an official
apology. Pronounced in collective terms and on controversial topics, the
official apology likewise provides situated material from which to begin
rhetorical investigation of a community’s understanding of its collective
norms at a given time.
In the first section of the article, I develop the interconnection between the
concept of rhetorical agency, official apologies, and theory of epideictic
rhetoric. This critical framework is then applied in a reading of a May
2005 ceremonial speech given by Danish prime minister Anders Fogh
Rasmussen that included an apology for wrongful actions committed against
German refugees by Danish officials during the Nazi occupation 1940–45.
This reading illustrates how an official apology was woven into a ceremonial
speech and considers the ways in which rhetorical agency is actualized in this
connection.
Rasmussen’s speech is notable because it was the first official apology pre-
sented publicly by a Danish government representative and, although the
nature of the apology itself clearly resonated with the majority of Danes,
2In an interview in the Danish newspaper Politiken, psychologist Svend Brinkmann thus regards the
official apology as a paradoxical phenomenon arguing that forgiveness is personal and cannot be
obtained collectively or by fiat just because an elected official issues an apology (Surrugue).
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the prime minister’s all but explicit framing of it in terms of a contemporary
political issue made the speech controversial. From a theoretical perspective,
the speech thus raises questions about what the rhetorical agency of an
official apologist rests on and how it may be challenged. Moreover, Rasmus-
sen’s statement is also notable by virtue of its self-reflexivity with regard to
his rhetorical agency. Ironically, Rasmussen’s efforts to create a speaking
position for himself turned out to be at best ambiguous, and in the eyes
of some Danes, they threatened to undermine his credibility as an official
apologist speaking for the community.
Rhetorical Agency and Official Apologies
The concept of rhetorical agency is an important and contested term in
rhetorical theory. It is important because in Hauser’s words it ‘‘raises
questions of voice, power, and rights, which place it at the center of this era’s
major social, political, economic, and cultural issues (‘‘Introduction’’ 183).
Agency is also contested because of its ‘‘chameleon-like quality [. . . circulat-
ing] among different intellectual traditions, generating questions, methodo-
logical considerations, and levels of analysis’’ (186).3 Hoff-Clausen, Isager,
and Villadsen state that rhetorical agency focuses on the constellation of
individual and structural aspects that in the interaction between the speaking
agent and the situational conditions are relevant for rhetorical meaning
making and action (57). Geisler observes that the concept spans questions
regarding the instrumental aspects of rhetoric as well as social, institutional,
political, cultural, and other factors conditioning a speaker’s access to
speaking and being heard (12–13).
Three contributions to the theorizing of rhetorical agency in particular
have inspired the conceptualization that frames this discussion. All three
focus attention on what I take to be central aspects: the fluid nature of
rhetorical agency, the collective nature of rhetorical meaning making, and
the interdependence of the speaker, the audience, and historical as well as
physical conditions.4 Clarke’s call for a focus on the way rhetorical agency
allows and constitutes inter-subjective speech, ‘‘creating and performing
the potentials of language and reason in particular situations and processes
of invention, thought, and choice’’ underscores the communal aspect of the
3The understanding of the term was thus a theme in itself at the 2003 ARS conference. See ensuing
contributions in Rhetoric Society Quarterly. Philosophy and Rhetoric dedicated a special issue to the
theme (37, 2004).
4All three were presented at the ARS conference in 2003 in the form of brief position papers.
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concept. Herndl’s thinking of rhetorical agency as ‘‘contingent on a matrix
of material and social conditions’’ and as ‘‘a social location into and out
of which social subjects move uncertainly’’ is helpful because of its recog-
nition of the dependency of rhetoric on outside factors. Finally, in this article
I respond to Lucaites’s call to ‘‘begin by identifying the wide range of ways in
which the modalities of action are constituted and implicated in particular
rhetorical performances.’’5
Recently, Lundberg and Gunn’s reaction to Geisler’s report from the ARS
conference challenged current thinking on the nature and role of rhetorical
agency. They argue that there is a tendency among rhetoricians to speak of
rhetorical agency in terms of ‘‘possession,’’ said to be problematic because
it reifies rhetorical agency into ‘‘a quantifiable ectoplasm’’ that can be
possessed and even transferred from one agent to another (89). This is
closely connected with another main point in the authors’ critique of Geisler
and others. When we speak of rhetorical agency as something that can be
possessed, we are prone to get trapped in the very mode of thinking that
the concept was first conceived as an antidote for—namely, a relationship
between agent and agency resembling a more traditional modern under-
standing of the autonomous subject and his or her more or less instrumental
use of rhetoric. Lundberg and Gunn seek to destabilize the assumed link
between rhetorical effect and rhetorical agent, and they propose a reframing
of the question ‘‘in terms of subjectivity and effect’’ (88–89). Moreover, by
means of the happy Ouija board metaphor, the invocation of the concept
of ‘‘ontotheology,’’ and the flippant talk of ‘‘ectoplasm,’’ the two authors
suggest that much of the discussion of rhetorical agency has an almost meta-
physical aura about it that is misguided, even naı¨ve (89).
Yet, even if we concede Lundberg and Gunn’s charge that the general
discussion of rhetorical agency has its share of jargon, that does not force us
to accept the authors’ radically ‘‘hospitable’’ conceptualization of rhetorical
agency as something that ‘‘possesses’’ an agent. Where they see an unproduc-
tive element of ‘‘ontotheology’’ in rhetorical theory and criticism, I suggest
a focus on the need, especially in pedagogical contexts, for more accessible
discussions of rhetorical agency in rhetorical criticism. Moreover, even if
some of the theoretical discussion about rhetorical agency repeats traditional
thoughts on rhetoric in a new vocabulary, this does not necessarily undercut
its significance. Rather, it may promote the accessibility of new ideas to
students and researchers alike by virtue of moving from the familiar to the
5All references to position papers are from www.comm.umn.edu/ARS/. This link is no longer active,
but information about the 2003 ARS conference is available at www.rhetoricalliance.org=.
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unfamiliar. Thus, I maintain that by studying rhetorical agency as it is played
out in fairly familiar rhetorical forms (such as official apologies) and from a
perspective of classically based theory (such as contemporary thinking on epi-
deictic rhetoric), we stand to enhance our understanding of the concept as it is
applied in specific acts of rhetorical criticism. Although the result is not meant
to lead to a complete definition of rhetorical agency, this interpretive compo-
nent of rhetorical criticism may indeed contribute to the kind of ‘‘conceptual
thickening’’ Leff observes when ‘‘theoretical precepts [. . .] are vibrated against
the particular case and are instantiated in an explanation of it’’ (347).
Several reasons recommend the rhetoric of official apologies as promising
material for examining aspects of rhetorical agency. First, the growing inci-
dence of this type of utterance attests to a common perception that discourse
can indeed affect strained human relations. From this perspective, rhetoric’s
potential for action seems to be both recognized and actualized in the official
apology. Second, the fact that the speaking agent rarely has any personal
responsibility for the wrongful deed (but by way of institutional position
must give expression to an apology) highlights questions of rhetorical agency
with respect to issues of representation and personal commitment. Finally,
the growing number of official apologies may indicate that rhetorical agency
is seeing more widespread instantiation. Groups formerly barred from voic-
ing their needs and wishes publicly have increasing success in gaining public
hearing and in demanding recognition of their suffering as caused by past
policies. This way, such groups obtain rhetorical agency insofar as they
acquire a speaking position from which to promote revaluation of past poli-
cies as suppressive, racist, or otherwise condemnable and thereby effect
change.6 Together, these aspects bring to attention the dynamic between
6This is Cunningham’s point when he writes that: ‘‘the greater emphasis on the concepts of
community or cultural identity (which is not to say that these are not slippery terms) may not only
involve considerations about constitutional structures or other policies, such as affirmative action,
but may also facilitate or encourage a politics of apology that, as I argued earlier, can reflect a
recognition of, and sensitivity toward, both past wrongs and their contemporary resonances’’
(292–293).
Another aspect of the dissemination of rhetorical agency concerns the relation between the speaker=
the apologizing institution and the victims of the misdeed. With what right does the speaker presume
to put into words other people’s hardship and suffering? Does one risk trivializing or in other ways
distorting the authentic, individual experience as Harter, Stephens, and Japp suggest (29–30)? Rollins
approached some of these questions in analyses of funeral orations by Jacques Derrida. She shed light
on a central challenge in epideictic rhetoric, namely the question of how one, in an ethically defens-
ible manner, can speak ‘‘the other,’’ that is, one’s fellow human being in all his or her inviolable and
fundamental authenticity. Rollins points to Rosenfield’s phenomenological view on rhetoric as a
place to begin. More work needs to be done in the exploration of this representational aspect of
rhetorical agency.
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the speaker, the audience, and the context in official apologies, a dynamic
thematized in epideictic theory. Before I discuss the potential for epideictic
theory as a valuable resource for conceptualizing rhetorical agency in official
apologies and as way to explain the genre as a site of public ethical reflection, a
few comments on the nature of the official apology as a subgenre are in order.
In their 1973 landmark article on the rhetoric of self-defense, Ware and
Linkugel presented apologia as a genre and suggested a terminology for the
factors and modes speakers may employ in self-defense with the aim of restor-
ing their personal public image. Downey has since shown that the genre has
developed significantly since antiquity (42). The official apology resembles
the individual’s apologia in that it is also a response to criticism and that it
aims at restoring strained relations. But on two points the official apology dif-
fers from the personal: it is presented on behalf of a collective, and it acknow-
ledges wrongdoing—thereby recognizing censure as appropriate. An
important distinction also needs to be made between apologiae presented
in one’s own name—what we might call personal apologiae—and apologiae
presented in a public collective’s name (such as a nation-state)—what we
might call official apologies. Koesten and Rowland found that rhetoric
intended to apologize for wrongdoing comprises a particular subgenre of apo-
logia, namely what they term ‘‘the rhetoric of atonement’’ and characterized
the function of this kind of utterance as ‘‘purgative-redemptive,’’ that is, serv-
ing as a symbolic gesture where the speaker wipes the slate clean and estab-
lishes the ground for a new beginning that can restore balance and health
in the community (69–71).7 They also suggested that ordinary apologia stra-
tegies are irrelevant when guilt is indisputable, and that the subgenre therefore
calls for very different responses than the personal apologia studied by Ware
and Linkugel. This is also the view of Harter, Stephens, and Japp who found
Ware and Linkugel’s terminology unsuited to capture the essence of publicly
ritualized institutional apologia (23).8
7I will not go into an examination of Rasmussen’s speech according to the five requirements to
genuine atonement rhetoric forwarded by Koesten and Rowland, but merely suggest that the speech
lives up to them with the possible exception of the need for proof of ‘‘mortification.’’ One possible
explanation for the lack of concrete suggestions aimed at avoiding a similar problem in the future
may be tied to the constraints of the situation. For example, a discussion of Denmark’s policy on
refugees would displace the focus of the ceremony. Koesten and Rowland also mention that where
expectations regarding mortification are clear when it comes to personally responsible speakers, a
nation or an organization’s expression of mortification may lie more in the choice of words and
not least reparation showing that one will compensate for=prevent repetition of the sins of the past
(74).
8Hearit has argued that corporate apology represents yet a type of apology that warrants special
consideration.
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Koesten and Rowland’s analysis of the subgenre is both succinct and
persuasive, but instead of calling this kind of utterance ‘‘rhetoric of atone-
ment,’’ I prefer official apology for several reasons. This term is a more
neutral and thus more inclusive term, whereas by highlighting that specific
function as characteristic of the genre ‘‘the rhetoric of atonement’’ may
overlook other functions. The term atonement also carries strong religious
connotations that may not be appropriate in communities with traditions
regarding the position of civic religion in the public sphere different from
those in the United States.9 Thus I maintain that to understand Danish
prime minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s apology in terms of atonement
may be misleading. Rather, his statement might be seen as an official
acknowledgment of an intolerable inconsistency in Denmark’s treatment
of Jews in the past—in itself a painful acknowledgement to make, but not
involving the level of personal involvement and contrition suggested by
the term atonement.10 In my reading, the prime minister’s apology amounts
to an act of ‘‘mortification’’ in Koesten and Rowland’s terminology by seek-
ing to confirm Denmark’s commitment to freedom of religion and non-dis-
criminatory policies toward minorities and denouncing official actions in
violation of these principles. In this respect, he successfully gave expression
to his audience’s sentiments and helped strengthen collective commitment to
humanistic values such as protection of innocent individuals. But nothing in
the speech indicates a desire to do more than that as the notion of atonement
would imply. Indeed, as we shall see, there were issues relating to Rasmussen’s
ethos and political commentary that destabilize his rhetorical agency when it
comes to atoning for thewrongdoingof the past. To explainhow these problems
arise, we need to further develop the triangulation between official apologies,
the concept of rhetorical agency, and contemporary epideictic theory.
Epideictic Theory and Rhetorical Agency in Official Apologies
Theory on epideictic is particularly useful in analyzing questions regarding
rhetorical agency as it concerns the role of language in relation to creating,
maintaining, or questioning communal values. The symbolic importance
9While Koesten and Rowland’s use of the term initially seems inspired by Kenneth Burke, whose use
of it was not linked to a particular faith, their article explicitly invokes Jewish scripture and practice,
thus making the religious connotations prominent. In an article discussing official apologia in an
Israeli context, Liebersohn, Neuman, and Bekerman point to an explicit rule against apologia in
the Jewish tradition and thus severely problematize a transfer of the concept of atonement from a
religious to a secular context (928).
10Whereas Danish Jews in many cases were aided in fleeing Nazi persecution during WWII, such
protection was not given to German Jews and Communists seeking refuge in Denmark.
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of language is especially noticeable in epideictic rhetoric, and by virtue of its
performative functions it is a particularly clear illustration that rhetoric in itself
is a form of action and as such implies a form of agency. To elaborate on the
way epideictic rhetoric can illuminate the rhetoric of official apologies, I
engage three theorists who havemade valuable contributions to this idea. Both
Oravec and Hauser emphasize the significant function vested in the speaker’s
ability to give expression to shared norms on behalf of the audience. Beale,
however, is more interested in the performative aspects of epideictic.
Oravec analyzes Aristotle’s discussion of the role of audience in relation to
epideictic speeches and concludes that there is more to the concept of theoroi
(the term used by Aristotle to refer to the listeners of the epideictic message)
than merely passive observation and entertainment. Here, I focus on Oravec’s
interest in the dialectical relation between the speaker and audience; if the
speaker does not present the topic in a manner that resonates with the
audience, his or her credibility will suffer (163). The speaker must obviously
have a clear understanding of the values and experiences of the audience. The
challenge lies in formulating these such that they ring true to the audience—
explicating or visualizing what otherwise may only exist on an unspoken
level. To the extent that the speaker is able to express the norms and values con-
sistent with the audience’s experience, he or she will establish a ground for
insight into shared social, cultural, or ethical values among the audience (171).11
Hauser, too, argues that a significant function of the epideictic genre is to
create a frame of understanding for the interpretation of reality (‘‘Aristotle’’
5). He stresses the pedagogical and thereby socially significant aspect of Aris-
totle’s treatment of epideictic rhetoric:
Aristotle’s notion of a properly ordered rhetoric assumes that responsible
persuasion translates the theoretical contents of politics into the praxis of
statescraft and citizenship. [. . .] In this respect, then, epideictic occupies a
unique place in celebrating the deeds of exemplars who set the tone for
civic community and the encomiast serves an equally unique role as a
teacher of civic virtue. (14)
Hauser underscores the didactic aspect of epideictic rhetoric, suggesting that
it ‘‘can educate us in the vocabulary of civic virtues that may constitute citi-
zens as an active public, and communicate principles on which responsible
citizenship may be based and a vibrant public sphere can thrive’’ (20).12
11See also Sullivan.
12Jasinski, too, mentions that several theorists, among them Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, have
worked with a much more nuanced conception of the genre and pointed to its massive significance
as basis for political rhetoric because its primary function is to gain adherence to values that later
make up the grounds for action (210).
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While Beale is also interested in the way the speaker together with the
audience explores the normative basis of the community, his focus is on
the situational and performative aspects of the epideictic encounter. He finds
inspiration in J. L. Austin’s speech act theory and emphasizes as the most
characteristic trait of the epideictic genre that, ‘‘The epideictic or ‘rhetorical
performative’ act is one that participates in the reality to which it refers’’
(226). Beale’s point is that the epideictic genre exists in the present in a more
complex manner than other rhetorical utterances that primarily concern
something outside them.13 He thus makes the observation regarding the
anchoring of epideictic rhetoric in a concrete situation that, ‘‘Epideictic
performances tend to be informed by the ‘present’ in very special ways, often
taking their very subjects and forms from the ‘present’ actions or ceremonies
in which they are embedded, and often serving to [. . . assess] ‘where we are
now’ as a community’’ (223).
Official apologies provide a touchstone for a given community concerning
the values and norms that characterize it. Unlike the personal apologia,
where the nature and degree of wrongdoing is typically contested, the official
apology in effect acknowledges wrongdoing, and the rhetorical act is meant
to demonstrate one’s recognition of the error, assumption of responsibility,
and moral distancing from the act.14 Whereas many theorists take an interest
in epideictic rhetoric as a site of profiling the positive norms and values of a
community, I also see the official apology as an instantiation of contempor-
ary epideictic rhetoric of censure because it condemns a certain behavior or
certain values and it invites the audience to distance themselves from such
acts or beliefs. Via a public recognition of a breach of particular norms,
the official apology constitutes a renewed statement of commitment to those
norms as it distances itself from their antidote. By explicating, possibly
reformulating, a normative groundwork, the official apology marks a
symbolic transfer from one understanding of the collective self to
another—strengthened through the acknowledgement of fault and vitalized
through renewed ethical commitment. This potential to reflect the values of
a community at a given time is what I see as the most interesting aspect of
official apologies. At once a site of reflection and a mode of rhetorical action,
13Beale tentatively defines a ‘‘rhetorical performative’’ as ‘‘the composed and more or less unified act
of rhetorical discourse which does not merely say, argue, or allege something about the world of
social action, but which constitutes (in some special way defined by the conventions or customs
of a community) a significant social action in itself. [. . .] The performative rhetorical act participates
in actions, and in doing so may be appropriate or inappropriate, seemly or unseemly’’ (225).
14It seems that narrative strategies often replace or supplement more formal argumentation. See, for
example, Achter and Harter, Stephens, and Japp.
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official apologies more concretely than most genres tell us what to avoid and
what to strive for.
Rhetorical Agency as Mandate in Official Apologies
My purpose in bringing theories of rhetorical agency and epideictic rhetoric
together in a discussion of official apologies is to highlight the special nature
of the relationship between the speaker and the audience in this kind of
rhetorical interaction. In the following, I shall discuss this in terms of mandate.
The official speaker has an institutionally sanctioned speaking position, but
this also depends on the dialectical relation between the speaker and the
audience on whose behalf he or she presents the apology. The nature of
the rhetorical agency of the speaker of official apologies is thus significantly
influenced by the consubstantiality he or she has with the audience. A
speaker unable to gauge and give expression to common sentiment will fail
to achieve the consubstantiality with the audience necessary for the mandate
to apologize on their behalf. If the speaker ignores or violates the norms and
values of the listeners, the apology may be judged empty or disingenuous
and the speaker’s mandate null.15 The speaker’s handling of the mandate
from the audience is thus critical to the apology’s credibility.16
In addition to this delicate interdependence where the speaker’s rhetorical
agency relies on the audience’s willingness as a group to assume the responsi-
bility for wrongful actions committed by individuals in the past, a particular
challenge lies in theorizing the relation between the speaker and those who
actually committed the wrongful act—some of whom may be among the
audience and thus implicitly form a part of the mandating public. A central
question is to what extent an apologist can be regarded as speaking on their
behalf as well. Assuming that the apologist successfully gauges the general
audience’s sentiments and, speaking on behalf of the community, condemns
the actions of the past, what significance does a possible lack of contrition on
the part of the persons who committed the act have for the speaker’s rhetori-
cal agency? Does their potential disapproval of the apology undermine its
15With regard to the performative aspects of official apologia, there may also be some conditions
regarding the constitution of the audience, for example, that it should count both individuals repre-
senting the harmed party and the perpetrators’ group to witness the pronouncement of the apology
for it to be ‘‘official.’’ For example, when former President Clinton offered an official apology for the
Tuskegee syphilis experiment, survivors of the experiment and their families were present at the cer-
emony in Washington, D.C.
16See Sullivan (126–127). Harter, Stephens and Japp call for more systematic discussion of audience
reactions in the evaluation of the apologetic rhetoric.
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force, or does the majority have the right to overrule subgroup dissent? In
answering these questions, Koesten and Rowland’s conditions of sincerity
and mortification as a litmus test of the rhetoric of atonement do not suffice,
for even if the speaker is personally sincere and has community and insti-
tutional support in issuing the apology, that may not reflect regret on the
part of those who were personally responsible. To the extent they or their
family and descendants are still a part of the collectivity in whose name
the apology is given (for example, as citizens in a state or former employees
of a corporation), there may be a discrepancy between their understanding
of the issue and the official rendition of it.17 Such mandate deficit may
undermine the speaker’s rhetorical agency in the eyes of those who hear
themselves being criticized publicly by an official speaker as well as those
apologized to. Likewise, a lack of contrition on the part of the historically
responsible parties, if disclosed, may feed public skepticism of official
apologies. Similarly, an official apology risks being met with the suspicion
that it was strategically motivated and meant to serve purposes of distraction
or window-dressing, as opposed to an opportunity to make statements of a
moral nature and to boost the credibility of the responsible institution. This
kind of skepticism may be expected in a political culture where ‘‘spin-
doctors’’ are credited with increasing strategic and even political influence.
But when objections are based in considerations inspired by speech act
theory, they may be countered. An important distinction here is that the
official apology is not given in the name of particular individuals, but in
the name of a collective—be it a government or some other organization.
This distinction is well made in Kiss’s differentiation between ‘‘collective
guilt’’ and ‘‘collective responsibility’’ in a study of a public controversy in
Hungary. She argued that:
collective guilt involves a judgment concerning a direct causal link
between the guilty person and a condemnable deed. Collective responsi-
bility in the sense meant here, by contrast, makes no such claim. Rather, it
consists of two parts. The first is an honest acknowledgement that a
wrong was done by members of a group with which I identify, and that
this wrong was committed, in some sense, in the group’s name. The
second is appropriate action in light of the acknowledged misdeed. (392)
Kiss’s point is that collective responsibility does not hold individuals causally
accountable for things they did not do. But taking on responsibility collec-
tively means that persons who identify with a group are willing to be held
17This sort of protest is documented in Kiss’ study of the controversy caused by Hungarian President
Go¨ncz’s official apology to victims of racist inspired violence (396).
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accountable for the future moral and political development of their
community. The official apology thus commits the community rather than
the causally responsible individuals. Hence, it means less if the Danish offi-
cials who turned away refugees from Nazi Germany personally regret these
actions. The main thing is that contemporary Danish society acknowledges
the wrongful nature of these acts and commits itself to avoiding similar
instances in the future. Kiss’s argument is critical as she suggests the wider,
cultural significance of collective memory and official apologies. If members
of a community are not willing to bear this responsibility together, Kiss
suggests ‘‘self-serving myths of innocence and one-sided tales of victimiza-
tion can dominate images of the nation and strangle serious and open public
debate on moral issues’’ (392). My previous point about epideictic theory’s
relevance for official apologies may confirm and elaborate Kiss’s point in
more positive terms; the official apology may be regarded as a way for a
community to deal with issues of moral, legal, or political misconduct and
move on. A key function of the official apology thus lies in its potential to
create a rhetorical space for reflecting on the values of a community at a
particular moment in time.
To illustrate the complex rhetorical nature of official apologies, I now turn
to a speech given in 2005 by Danish Primeminister Anders Fogh Rasmussen.18
Rasmussen’s speech illustrates characteristic traits of official apologies
but it also gives the critic occasion to reflect on his rhetorical agency and
the significance hereof for the overall commemorative purpose of the
speech.
The Prime Minister’s Apology
2005 was the sixtieth anniversary of the end of WWII and thus also of
Denmark’s liberation from the wartime occupation. In Denmark, the
liberation is commemorated every year on the 4th of May with a ceremony
held at Mindelunden (‘‘Memorial Grove’’), Copenhagen to mark the anniver-
sary of the 4 May 1945, BBC evening radio broadcast announcing that
German troops had surrendered. Because of the 60-year anniversary, the
commemoration was given special attention in 2005, and prime minister
Anders Fogh Rasmussen spoke at the ceremony. In attendance were
18An official statement by a prime minister may not seem the most likely candidate to push the limits
of our understanding of how rhetorical agency is constituted and manifested. As Geisler points out,
the concept of rhetorical agency seems to have made the most headway in studies of the rhetoric of
subaltern and other traditionally silenced groups (10–11). Nevertheless, I suggest that it may be a
constructive starting point for appreciating aspects of the official apology.
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representatives of the Royal family, former resistance members and their
descendants, as well as invited British war veterans who participated in the
Allied forces’ arrival in Denmark in May 1945. The area of Ryvangen, where
Mindelunden is located, was used by the Nazis as an execution site for Danish
resistance members. As such it provided an appropriate setting for the prime
minister’s message acknowledging what he called the ‘‘courageous acts’’ of
the resistance members.19 He also thanked them for ‘‘saving Denmark’s
honor’’ and for ‘‘secur[ing] the self respect of the Danish people.’’20
The prime minister’s speech was in many ways a typical ceremonial speech—
employing traditional strategies such as the use of examples and amplification to
praise the individuals who were the focus of the ceremony. Embedded in this
epideictic speech, however, we also find elements of a different genre: the official
apology. Over the course of four paragraphs, Rasmussen discussed the role of
Danish authorities in the mistreatment of Jewish refugees seeking protection
in Denmark fromNazi persecution. He also made note of other innocent people
whom the Danish authorities, according to Rasmussen, expelled ‘‘to suffering
and death in concentration camps’’ and ‘‘abandoned to an uncertain fate in
the hands of the Nazi regime.’’ The primeminister called the Danish authorities’
actions ‘‘shameful events’’ and a ‘‘stain on the [. . .] otherwise good reputation of
Denmark.’’ He continued, ‘‘I therefore want [. . .] on behalf of the government
and thereby of the Danish state to regret and apologize for these deeds.’’
The speech caught public interest for several reasons. The mere fact that
the prime minister included an official apology was notable as there is
virtually no precedent for official apologies in the history of Danish govern-
ment rhetoric.21 Moreover, the very thought of criticizing Denmark’s
19By means of five named personal examples, the prime minister portrayed the breath in social back-
ground and ages among resistance members and emphasized the personal suffering they all went
through, most of them with fatal consequences. Through a series of antithetical phrases, the prime
minister underscored the courageous and noble initiative in mounting active resistance, for example:
‘‘They did not worry about what would be useful but about what was truthful. They did not just take
care of themselves. They took action. They gave their lives for our freedom.’’
20All translations from Rasmussen’s speech are the author’s own.
21One possible exception is former Danish Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen’s apology to the
indigenous people of Thule, Greenland for the 1953 expropriation of their hunting territory and
forced relocation to make room for an American air base. The Danish government repeatedly
declined to apologize for the relocation until, following a court case that decided that the relocation
was forced, the Danish prime minister gave an apology in a private telephone conversation with the
president of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) Aqqaluk Lynge, on 2 September 1998 in which
he uttered the Inuit word for ‘‘I’m sorry,’’ utatserquatserpunga. The prime minister also issued a writ-
ten statement saying, ‘‘On behalf of the Danish state I apologize to the Inuit, the population of Thule,
and to the whole population of Greenland for the way the decision about the move was taken and
carried out’’ (www.nunatsiaq.com).
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treatment of Jews during the occupation is quite controversial to a nation
accustomed to a virtually unchallenged collective memory of the Danes as
protectors of Danish Jews.22 Of additional note, the prime minister’s speech
was seen as using the celebration of the resistance during WWII to bolster his
own government’s policy of supporting the war in Iraq. Many Danes who
agreed with the prime minister’s apology to the mistreated Jewish refugees felt
that he misused the occasion and the public support for the apology as well as
the more general ceremonial occasion to gather political support for Denmark’s
unpopular participation in the war in Iraq. In this way, they felt that Rasmussen
implicitly made a controversial shift from an epideictic to a deliberative message.
In the following paragraphs I will show how the prime minister’s problematic
ethos in relation to the ceremonial part of the speech negatively influenced
his rhetorical agency as an official apologist in the same speech.
At first glance, Rasmussen’s position as an elected official would seem
enough to warrant the representative rhetorical function of the speech; as
prime minister he would be expected to speak on the nation’s behalf.
Regardless of the uncontested nature of his speaking position, Rasmussen
nevertheless made several references to his own role in relation to the situ-
ation and to the inherent message of the speech. These comments rather
succinctly thematize some basic requirements for the constitution of rhetori-
cal agency. For example, early on in the speech Rasmussen commented on
his personal relationship to the situation: ‘‘I did not experience the occu-
pation and liberation myself. But it moves me deeply to stand among these
graves. It is overwhelming to think of the many fates behind the names on
the gravestones.’’ Here, Rasmussen responded to a perceived expectation
of personal involvement. To compensate for his lack of personal experience
with these events, he showed an emotional reaction to the surroundings and
to the occasion. Although these comments were presented to solidify his
speaking position, we shall later see how they also may be used to problema-
tize the basis of his rhetorical agency in this situation.
Once he had established a personal emotional connection, Rasmussen
actually used his elected office as his main access to rhetorical agency, taking
on the role as spokesperson for Denmark through phrases such as ‘‘Tonight
we must not forget,’’ ‘‘In Denmark we may not forget,’’ ‘‘Denmark will never
forget,’’ ‘‘Tonight we remember all the freedom fighters who gave their lives
so that we may live in freedom, peace and progress,’’ and ‘‘We are deeply
22The vast majority of Danish Jews escaped Nazi persecution thanks to help from other Danes who
hid them and helped them flee to Sweden hidden in the bottom of fishing boats crossing the sound at
night.
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indebted to them.’’ Similarly, in the passages of the speech concerning the
official apology, he proposed a collective rather than an individual, personal
recognition of the misdeed: ‘‘Worse is that we, today, know that Danish
authorities in some instances contributed to the expulsion of people to
suffering and death in concentration camps.’’23 Stating that ‘‘recollection
of the dark sides of the occupation’’ is a ‘‘necessary part’’ of the marking
of the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation, Rasmussen used his position
as prime minister to assign the responsibility for remembering to the Danish
people in the form of collective memory.
Significantly, as he turned to the discussion of the resistance members’
sacrifices, Rasmussen transcended these personal, collective, and historical
levels and framed the discussion by means of a distinction between, in his
words, ‘‘what is right and what is wrong.’’ By reframing the issue of political
and military resistance as a moral imperative, the prime minister circum-
vented possible objections to his perceived lack of personal and historical
connection with the topic and instead re-inscribed it as a timeless, ethical
issue. In this move, I see Rasmussen negotiating his rhetorical agency from
one of relatively limited and predictable ceremonial significance to one of
greater moral and political scope. Reframing the issue of the occupation
era government’s policy in this way allowed Rasmussen greater rhetorical
scope than to just commemorate. Through the moral framing, Rasmussen
was able to forcefully disclaim the events of the past without immediately
opening himself to charges of simply giving expression to hindsight.
Rasmussen’s high level of self-reflexivity concerning the various aspects
of his speaking position, and the fact that he so explicitly anchored his
rhetorical agency in time and place as well as on moral grounds, suggests that
these matters are crucial to the agency of the speech. This is all the more clear
from the fact that the prime minister implicitly raised the question of
rhetorical agency. Commenting on its value as a speech act he remarked:
‘‘An apology cannot change history. But it can serve to acknowledge histori-
cal mistakes. So that current and coming generations hopefully will avoid
similar mistakes in the future.’’ This self-reflexive remark speaks to the
symbolic significance associated with an official apology from a state leader.
Rasmussen’s comments concerning the rhetorical agency of his statement of
apology and its careful wording (‘‘I therefore want . . . on behalf of the
government and thereby the Danish state to regret and apologize for these
actions’’) suggest an eagerness to signal sincerity and forestall possible
23Rasmussen compares this knowledge to thinking ‘‘of the victims of the resistance fight who did not
even get a proper grave.’’
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criticism for paying lip service or eschewing moral responsibility.24 There
are, however, at least two issues that complicate the rhetorical agency of
the prime minister’s official apology: one regards the apology’s placement
in the context of a speech of praise of the Resistance; the other is the con-
nection to the prime minister’s political agenda as a whole.
First, with regard to the context of the apology, it would arguably have lent
the expression of remorse more weight had it been presented in an inde-
pendent statement and not just worked into an otherwise relatively uncon-
troversial context. Second, the apology was interpreted as somewhat
undercut by the prime minister’s political agenda in general, and especially
with his other public statements regarding that era. As we have seen, offering
an official apology implies an assumption of responsibility for actions one
does not condone for the sake of the future civic health of the community.
But Rasmussen’s speech illustrates that there may be limits to how much one
can criticize others and then symbolically take responsibility for their
actions. The possibility of creating the basic identification between the
speaker and the guilty group to make the assumption of collective responsi-
bility credible may be seriously weakened if the speaker has previously
denounced the guilty group more generally and thereby distanced himself
or herself from it. In Rasmussen’s case, he had already from the beginning
of the year been a harsh critic of the so-called Cooperation Government25
that had sanctioned the Danish authorities’ actions during the occupation.
In fact, Rasmussen criticized the policies of the ‘‘Cooperation Government’’
again in a speech the day after the ceremony at Mindelunden.26 Rasmussen’s
disavowal of the policy of the occupation-era government combined with his
24It would thus seem that he does not just leave it at regretting (which involves a lesser degree of
personal responsibility and mortification), but successfully completes the speech act of apologizing.
Moreover, he preempts predictable criticism that an apology cannot undo the wrongs of the past
by expressing the wish that the apology will not only have an influence on contemporary understand-
ing of the occupation of Denmark but also may serve as inspiration for a more proper behavior in the
future.
25The government in place at the time of the German occupation is often referred to as the
‘‘Cooperation Government’’ due to its decision to work with the Nazi occupation force in order
to secure as much influence as possible and in the hope that such cooperation would be beneficial
to the Danish people.
26He addressed this issue in a speech given the next day, 5 May 2005 at the Town Hall of Copenhagen
to an audience including veterans from the resistance movement and politicians in the city govern-
ment (www.statsministeriet.dk). The prime minister’s criticism of the cooperation government had
been controversial. He was criticized for showing a lack of appreciation of the difficult political
dilemmas of the occupation period, for being full of hindsight, and perhaps worst of all, for exploit-
ing the liberation anniversary as an opportunity to justify his own decision to let Denmark partici-
pate as a U.S. ally in what to many Danes was perceived as an illegal war in Iraq. See also Bryld.
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sharp distinction between right and wrongful deeds during the occupation in
effect distanced him from those actions. In light of this distance, the question
presents itself of how much of the responsibility for the wrongful deeds he
really showed himself and his cabinet willing to assume: He might regret
the turning away of Jewish refugees, but given his general moral disapproval
of the historically responsible government, the question remained to many
Danes whether he had rhetorically distanced himself so much from those
historically responsible parties that his appeal to both collective and insti-
tutional responsibility implicit in the apology did not sound sincere. This
may in the end be a matter of political opinion, but a closer look at the speech
shows that Rasmussen arguably paved the way for this criticism himself.
We saw earlier that Rasmussen framed his comments on the events of
WWII in terms of right and wrong; he condemned the decision of the
cooperation government to work with the Nazi occupation forces and
applauded the resistance members’ efforts to combat the occupation. To a
contemporary Danish audience, it was clear that Rasmussen saw an analogy
between the political dilemmas of WWII and those of the war in Iraq and
that he felt that under his leadership, Denmark had done the morally right
thing by joining the Allied forces in the war in Iraq. Whereas Rasmussen
characterized his own government’s policy as based in morally correct
judgment in contrast to what he regarded as the cooperation government’s
opportunistic deferral of protest against Nazi Germany, many Danes were
less sure of Rasmussen’s alleged higher moral ground considering Denmark’s
participation in the war in Iraq—a war believed by many to be illegal. To
some listeners, Rasmussen’s support of the war in Iraq thus presented a
problem to his credibility as spokesperson for a nation allegedly sensitive
to the suffering of victims of wartime crimes and thereby undermined the
moral force of an apology issued by him.
The case of Rasmussen’s apology suggests that there may be limits as to
how much distance—historical, political, personal, and moral—there can
be between the person issuing the apology and the historically responsible
party. In other words, the smaller the speaker’s degree of identification with
the responsible party, the less committing it may be to apologize officially for
their actions. The guilty may be publicly criticized, but by keeping the issue
at arm’s length, the speaker belies the intensity of the collective responsibility
taken, and the symbolic power of mortification is thus diminished. In such
circumstances an official apology may risk losing credibility. In Rasmussen’s
case, his enjoinment of the audience to assume moral responsibility for the
actions of a former government stands to lose ethical and rhetorical force to
listeners cognizant of his own moral disassociation from that government.
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Implications
I have suggested that the rhetoric of official apologies is a promising locus
for examining the concept of rhetorical agency, and that the concept of
rhetorical agency in turn is useful in explaining certain functions of official
apologies. Further I have suggested that epideictic theory can offer a theoreti-
cal frame for conceptualizing the interplay of speaker, subject, and context in
official apologies in terms of rhetorical agency. One implication of my dis-
cussion is that it allows us to recognize several aspects of rhetorical agency in
the genre of official apologies, among these the question of mandate and the
functions of mortification and atonement. Further, I wish to point to the
cultural significance I see in manifestations of rhetorical agency in official
apologies. As my discussion of the relevance of epideictic theory has shown,
the official apology may provide a site for evaluating action in terms of a cul-
ture or a community’s norms and values and thereby recommitting the com-
munity to certain values and norms. The discourse of official apologies is
interesting to rhetorical critics because it offers insight into the values and
social motives prevalent in a society at a given time by inviting ‘‘individuals
to evaluate the communities or institutions to which they belong, their own
roles within them, and the roles and responsibilities of their fellow constitu-
ents, including their leaders’’ (Sheard 771). Further, by viewing the rhetoric
of official apologies in an epideictic perspective, we come closer to being able
to answer questions of what kind of rhetorical agency official apologies call
for and are characterized by. Although the official apology in many ways can
be regarded as a genre that looks back and brings closure, I suggest that it
also has an element of constructive orientation toward the future. This
way it holds a potential for facilitating a measure of rhetorical agency for
the auditors, too: it invites reflection on society’s norms and the individual’s
stance in relation hereto.27 As such the official apology represents a mode of
reflection on the norms of society, perhaps a recollection of values that in
Sheard’s words ‘‘may have been forgotten, and so the disparity between
existing and desired conditions becomes the subject of critique’’ (779), but
potentially also a recommitment to values fit to inspire future collective
action. Thus, the official apology may be a site of rhetorical agency for its
27Sheard discusses a similar potential in more traditional ceremonial speaking. She asks how epideictic
discourse, traditionally conceptualized as not being connected to immediate action in the world, can
motivate social, political, or other ideological change. Her answer is found in instances of epideictic
rhetoric that arguably involves an element of social critique such as Martin Luther King’s March on
Washington speech, Bill Clinton’s first inaugural, and Maya Angelou’s inaugural poem. These exam-
ples, according to Sheard, ‘‘give significant attention to topoi of blame and provoke a shuffling of
values’’ (779).
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auditors insofar as it invites them to partake in an ethical re-evaluation and
exhorts them to help actualize a better social order—wiser through the
mistakes of the past.
Finally, in response to Lundberg and Gunn’s reservations about concep-
tions of rhetorical agency that reduce it to ‘‘ectoplasm,’’ a magic power
transferable from one speaker to another, this study has suggested that
rhetorical agency in the discourse of official apologies is not magical, but
based in rather concrete elements of the communicative context. It emerges
as a fusion of personal and institutional ethos on the part of the speaker,
more or less explicit commentary on the speaker’s access to the role as
apologist in accordance with his or her mandate from the audience, and
finally a more elusive sense of fidelity to the values at stake reflected in
the speaker’s credibility vis a` vis the act of apologizing. My discussion of
Rasmussen’s speech and reflections on the practical, ethical, and theoretical
possibilities for making public apologies have aimed to show that rhetorical
agency is complex, but can be broken down and analyzed part by part. This
way, we need not settle with finding a speaker ‘‘possessed’’ with rhetorical
agency, but may indeed be able to put into words more precisely in what
ways a certain rhetorical act is made to function and, not least, in what
ways it may instantiate rhetorical agency for the speaker and the auditors,
respectively.
By regarding official apologies in the light of rhetorical theory about
epideictic rhetoric, the potentially valuable rhetorical functions and ethical
potential of this type of discourse are brought into focus, highlighting the
fact that it is a fertile context for formulating and specifying the fundamental
values and ethical orientation of a given society or collective. Further,
epideictic seems particularly promising in examining questions of rhetorical
agency because it turns our attention to the importance of language in
matters of creating, maintaining, or questioning communal values, and
because it poses functional questions about the possibilities of rhetoric to
serve as symbolic action, such as what it really means to apologize.
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